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THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
Meeting of the Council of the North Carolina State Bar
April 14, 1950
The quarterly meeting of the Council of the State Bar was held in
the Justice Building, Raleigh, N. C., Friday, April 14 with the following officers and members present: J. B. James, President, L. J. Poisson,
E. L. Cannon, J. D. Grimes, Z. V. Norman, Julius Banzet, I. R. Williams, Albion Dunn, John D. Warlick, Thomas W. Davis, R. P. Reade,
G. H. Hastings, J. F. Spruill, Jennings G. King, B. F. Williams, Kyle
Hayes, R. W. Proctor, and John Queen.
The meeting was called to order by the President and the minutes
of the January meeting were read by the Secretary and approved as
read. Members of the Council who were absent due to sickness or court
engagements were Messrs. Jones, Glidewell, Bailey, Sapp, McLean,
Robins and Walton.
The report of the Executive Committee was made by Mr. Davis in
the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Jones. The Committee reported that
it had checked the receipts and disbursements for the quarter ending
March 31 and found same to be in order and correct.
The report of the Ethics Committee was made by Judge Hastings,
Chairman, on the following items:
1. Inquiry from attorneys on the question of whether or not
it is proper for members of the Bar to charge fees for issuing
certificates to re-hear under Rule 44. The Committee recommended that in its opinion it would be improper for any attorney
to charge any fee for such certificates and that Rule 44 so contemplates by virtue of the provision that such attorneys shall have no
interest in the subject matter and have not been a counsel for
either party to the litigation. The recommendation of the Committee was unanimously adopted.
2. Inquiry of attorney as to the use of name of deceased partners bearing the same name as attorney on letterhead of continuing firm, all bearing same name. The Committee recommended
that they saw no objection to such use of names unless the same
were forbidden by local Bar custom. The recommendation of the
Committee was unanimously adopted.
3. Question presented as to the use by an attorney of stationery and other material carrying the words "Certified Public Accountant-Attorney at Law." It was their opinion that same was
improper. The recommendation of the Committee was unanimously adopted.
The President asked for the report of the Unauthorized Practice
Committee, made by Mr. Grimes, Chairman. The Committee recom-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 28

mended approval of a letter to be sent to all attorneys who are counsel
for banks, requesting their cooperation in connection with unauthorized
practice of law and the activities of banks in advertising and solicitation material. Recommendation of the Committee was unanimously
adopted. The Committee further recommended the investigation by the
Secretary of several cases reported in Montgomery and Watauga
Counties.
The President called for report of the Membership Committee, made
by Mr. Banzet, acting in the absence of the Chairman. The Committee
recommended that Charles Seligson, previously granted inactive status,
be placed on the active list. The recommendation of the Committee was
adopted.
The President called for the report of special committee to confer
with the Industrial Commission. Mr. Spruill, Chairman, reported that
his committee had conference with the Chairman of the Industrial Commission. and he reported the substance of the conference to the Council
for information.
The Legislative Committee and the Post War Work Committee reported that they had no reports to make at this meeting.
The President called for report of the Grievance Committee, which
was made by Mr. Reade, Chairman. The Committee reported on a
number of matters being considered by it and the same were continued
for further study upon recommendation of the Committee and approval
of the Council.
The Secretary made a statement to the Council relative to pending
matters concerning unauthorized practice, complaints and the work in
the office, both as to the State Bar and Board of Law Examiners.
The Council proceeded to election of two members of the Board of
Law Examiners for three-year terms, the terms of Messrs. Greene and
Van Winkle expiring before the next meeting of the Council. George
B. Greene of Kinston and Kingsland Van Winkle of Asheville were
nominated and upon vote were duly elected for three year terms on the
Board of Law Examiners.
There being no further business, the Council adjourned.
Unauthorized Practice of Law
The Council of the North Carolina State Bar, having considered the opinion of the Attorney General dated June 2,
1949 relative to the practice of law and mnore specifically to
the practice before the Employment Security Commission,
and it appearing that much valuable information is contained
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in this opinion, they therefore wish as wide a dissemination
among the Bar as is possible and for this reason requested
the publication of said opinion in full in space allotted to the
Bar by the LAw REVIEW.

Edward L. Cannon
Secretary
2 June 1949
SUBJECT: Employment Security Commission; Corporations; Practicing Law; Right of Corporation to be Represented by
Agent Who is a Layman before the Employment Security
Commission; Right of Claimant to be Represented by Another Person or Agent of Labor Union; Witnesses; Right
of Cross-Examination of Witness Appearing before Deputy of Employment Security Commission.
Mr. W. D. Holoman, Chief Counsel
Employment Security Commission
Caswell Building
Raleigh, North Carolina

-'

Dear Mr. Holoman:
I have been delayed in answering your letter in regard to the above
subjects because I had considerable work left over after the adjournment of the General Assembly to which I was compelled to give prior
attention. The delay is regretted. The questions raised in your letter
seem to be the result of an exchange of correspondence between you and
Colonel Kendall, on the part of the Commission, and Mr. Robert S.
Cahoon, an attorney at Greensboro. I have before me copy of letter
of Mr. Cahoon, dated February 28th, 1949, reply of the Chairman,
Colonel Kendall, &latedMarch 5th, 1949, letter of Mr. Cahoon, dated
March 7th, 1949, and your original letter in which these questions are
presented.
Briefly stated, Mr. Cahoon calls attention to a disposition or practice
on the part of employers to send representatives, personnel managers
or office managers to appear in hearings before deputies of the Commission. As I understand the matter, these representatives of an em,ployer are laymen in the sense that they are not licensed to practice law;
and very frequently they appear in behalf of corporations who are employers under your Act. It is Mr. Cahoon's experience that some of
these representatives, in the capacity of a witness, testify from records
or give hearsay evidence as to the cause of separation or other facts
relative to the claimant's claim for benefits. It is pointed out that benefits paid to claimants under the Employment Security Law are not large
sums and that no lawyer can afford to represent a claimant because the
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Employment Security Law (G. S. 96-17(b)) severely limits the payment of fees to attorneys. It is further pointed out in this correspondence
that representatives of unions (it is implied that these representatives
are not attorneys) have prepared themselves on the rules and law .for
the purpose of assistance to their members who are claimants and that
the agents or deputies of the Commission have advised such representatives that only a lawyer may represent a claimant. Mr. Cahoon points
to an instance in Rockingham, North Carolina, where a capable representative of a textile workers' union sought to aid one of his friends
and a member of his union but was not allowed to participate in the
hearing. Colonel Kendall's letter of March 5th, 1949, goes fully into
the statutes covering the matter and sets forth the general policy of the
Commission. In reply, Mr. Cahoon refers to another instance of a
hearing held to determine the benefit rights of a claimant. It is asserted
that at this hearing, the employer, a large corporation, was represented
by a man from the employer's personnel office. This man is not a lawyer. It is asserted that he appeared with a large file of records, stated
the corporation's position, read into the record conclusions and hearsay
evidence and refused to submit to cross-examination as a witness. It is
said that he, of his own initiative, presented the employer's evidence and
determined when to conclude the employer's evidence. He asked for and
obtained a continuance on the part of the employer. It is asserted that
this man regularly does this type of work and in the same capacity or
manner as an attorney except that he does not cross-examine witnesses.
Further facts are stated, but enough has already been recited for the purposes of answering your questions. It will be seen that Mr. Cahoon,
either purposely or inadvertently, attempts to draw a comparison between the practices of employers acting through laymen representatives
before the Commission and its deputies and the attempted assistance of
agents and members of labor unions who attempt to advise and assist
their members in hearings before the Commission and its deputies.
In your letter to this office, you call our attention to a regulation
of the Commission (S 4.204 D) which governs the deputy as to the
conduct of a hearing and the examination of witnesses. You also refer
to the various statutes of this state governing the practice of law, and
you submit to our office certain questions as follows:
"1. Is the Commission properly interpreting the law when it declines
to allow any person representing a liable corporation to appear before
the Commission, or its deputies, and argue the case from the standpoint
of-the corporation?
"2. Section 84-5 provides that it is unlawful for any corporation to
practice or appear as attorney for any person other than itself. Who
may, therefore, appear and represent the corporation-Must it be one
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of its officers, or may the corporation designate any of its personnel to
appear and represent it?
"3. How far should we go in permitting a representative of a corporation to file pleadings of any nature before the Commission? (Question No. 2 requests information as to what representative may appear.)
"4. Are we correct in refusing to allow a representative of a labor
union to appear for and on behalf of a claimant to question the claimant
as a witness, or to argue the law in respect to the questions involved?
(If any union representative desires to have questions propounded, it is
our policy for the deputy to consider the request of the union representative and, if in his judgment it is a proper question, then the deputy will
ask such question.)
"5. Mr. Cahoon in his letter of March 17th stated that Mr. Lane, of
the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, appeared in the Templeton case
and appears quite often for Reynolds. The assertion that he is referred
to in the record as representative of the employer is immaterial so far
as this agency is concerned. Certainly, we did not mean to infer, and
do not think, that the use of the phrase 'representative of the employer'
in any way indicates that he is anything other than a witness, and certainly we did not intend for it to mean that he was an attorney, or that
he could act as an attorney. Mr. Cahoon also stated, in effect, that
after testifying Mr. Lane refused to submit to cross-examination as a
witness, and that he requested and obtained a recess on behalf of the
employer; determined and presented the employer's hearsay evidence
on his own initiative and on his own initiative determined when to conclude the employer's evidence; that Mr. Memory, Appeals Deputy,
stated to him, Mr. Cahoon, that if Mr. Lane requested a continuance of
the hearing on behalf of the employer, it would be granted. In other
words, Mr. Cahoon indicates by such statement that Mr. Lane was, for
all intents and purposes, appearing as an attorney for the employer. Did
Mr. Lane, assuming that he is not an officer, have a right to do- the
things and perform the functions before our deputy or before the Commission, which he attempted as alleged by Mr. Cahoon?
"6. If Mr. Lane should be considered an officer of the corporation,
would he be permitted to do the things and perform the functions before our deputy, or the Commission, which he attempted as alleged by
Mr. Cahoon?
"7. Will we be correct in advising Mr. Cahoon that any person who
gives direct testimony at a hearing will be required to submit himself to
cross-examination by the attorney representing the claimant, or the employer as the case may be, or by the Claims Deputy or Appeals Deputy
conducting the hearing--If such witness is required to submit himself
to cross-examination and refuses to do so upon an order of the deputy,
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what is our remedy-Should we petition the Clerk of the Superior Court
to issue an order ordering the witness to submit to cross-examination ?"
In essence, it seems to me that the solutions or answers to most of
your questions will be determined by a construction of our statutes
dealing with the practice of law and in determining how far a corporation can go in having itself represented by an agent of the corporation
who is not a licensed attorney, but, as we say, a layman.
The practice of law is -defined by G. S.84-2.1, and this section was
amended, for purposes of clarification, by Chapter 468 of the Session
Laws of 1945 (G. S. 84-2.1, Cumulative Supplement of 1947). As
pointed out by you, the important sections which bring into focus your
questions are represented by G. S. 84-4 and G. S. 84-5, which deal,
among other things, with the prohibitions and rights of corporations
with reference to the practice of law. For the sake of clarity, I quote
the statutes with which we are dealing in this letter as follows:
"S 84-2.1. 'Practicelaw defined.-The phrase 'practice law' as used
in this chapter is defined to be performing any legal service for any
other person, firm or corporation, with or without compensation, specifically including the preparation or aiding in the preparation of deeds,
mortgages, wills, trust instruments, inventories, accounts or reports of
guardians, trustees, administrators or executors, or preparing or aiding
in the preparation of any petitions or orders in any probate or court
proceeding; abstracting or passing upon titles, the preparation and filing
of petitions for use in any court, or assisting by advice, counsel, or
otherwise in any such legal work; and to advise or give opinion upon
the legal rights of any person, firm or corporation: Provided, that the
above reference to particular acts which are specifically included within
the definition of the phrase 'practice law' shall not be construed to limit
the foregoing general definition of such term, but shall be construed to
include the foregoing particular acts, as well as all other acts within said
general definition."
"S 84-4. Corporations and persmnis other than members of state
bar prohibitedfrom practicing law; exceptions.-It shall be unlawful for
any corporation or any person or association of persons, except members of the bar of the state of North Carolina admitted and licensed to
practice as attorneys at law, to appear as attorney or counsellor-at-law
in any action or proceeding in any court in this state or before any
judicial body or the North Carolina industrial commission or the unemployment compensation commission; to maintain, conduct, or defend
the same, except in his own behalf as a party thereto; or, by word, sign,
letter, or advertisement, to hold out himself, or themselves, as competent or qualified to give legal advice or counsel, or to prepare legal documents, or as being engaged in advising or counselling in law or acting
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as attorney or counsellor-at-law, or in furnishing the services of a lawyer or lawyers: * * *"

"S 84-5. Further prohibition as to practice of law by corporation;
exceptons.-It shall be unlawful for any corporation to practice or appear as an attorney for any person other than itself in any court in this
state, or before any judicial body or the North Carolina industrial commission or the unemployment compensation commission, or hold itself
out to the public or advertise as being entitled to practice law; and no
corporation shall organize corporations, or draw agreements, or other
legal documents not relating to its lawful business, or draw wills, or practice law, or give legal advice not relating to its lawful business; or hold
itself out in any manner as being entitled to do any of the foregoing acts,
by or through any person orally or by advertisement, letter or circular: * * *"

I have quoted all of some of these sections but only such parts
as I deemed pertinent to a solution of your questions. As pointed out
by you, when one person undertakes to act for another person, firm or
corporation in the capacity of handling legal matters, it does not affect
the question or definition of the practice of law, if compensation is or
is not paid for such service; and as further pointed out, the giving of
advice or counsel in legal matters is prohibited by the statute except
for duly licensed attorneys who are members of the Bar. Certain specific acts are named in the definition as coming within the term or definition of "practicing law," but these do not limit the general definition
of the term.
The question of how far corporations can go in legal proceedings
and hearings by means of the representation by agents of the corporation
who are laymen has been the subject of many judicial decisions. The
reports of the various appellate courts are filled with decisions on this
question, which have arisen by reason of the activities of trust companies, automobile associations, title and abstract companies, tax services, incorporated firms of certified public accountants, and many other
activities of incorporated firms. The Federal Courts have had to deal
with the question by reason of S 272 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S.
C. A., S 394) ; and as this has some bearing on our question, I quote
this section from the Judicial Code as follows:
"Appearance personally or by counsel.-In all of the courts of the
United States the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally, or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as, by
the rules of the said courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein."
Under the above-quoted provisions, certain corporations contended
that they had a right to conduct their legal matters in court hearings and
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in the matter of filing pleadings and motions. It was contended that
they had a right to carry through this type of conduct by means of their
own agents who were not attorneys but were laymen and, in some cases,
executive officers of the corporations concerned. In a series of cases on
this subject, the Federal Courts have pointed out that at common law,
a corporation is considered incapable of appearing personally in any
action. It was further pointed out that a corporation, although a legal
entity, is an artificial one which can do no act except through its agents
who, for purposes of representing the corporation in court, must be
attorneys at law who have been admitted to practice, or officers of the
court and subject to its control. It was held in substance that under
this act which governed appearances generally in the Federal Courts, a
person who was not admitted to practice law before the court could not
appear to conduct its litigation even though in one instance, the president of a defendant corporation attempted to appear and conduct its
case. In other words, a corporation cannot appear in person or personally. Brandstein v. White Lamps, 20 Fed. Supp. 369; Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Supp. 175.
Other states whose statutes contain provisions substantially similar
to the above-quoted provision of the Judicial Code of the United States
are in accord with the holdings of the Federal Courts. Bennie v. Triangle
Ranch Co., 216 P. 718 (Col.); Mortgage Commissim of New York v.
Great Neck Improveent Co., 295 N. Y. S. 107, 114.
In the case of Brandstein v. White Lamps, supra, the Court, in disposing of the question as to the authority of the president of a corporation to verify and file an answer in a patent infringement suit, said:
"In the case of Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(D. C.) 9 F. Supp. 175, it was said:
"'Obviously plaintiff corporation could not plead and manage its
case personally, as provided in 28 U. S. C. A. S 394, nor could it manage
it through an agent of its appointment who is not an attorney of the
court.'
"There is also a dictum to the same effect in Heiskell v. Mozie, 65
App. D. C. 255, 82 F. (2d) 861, where the court denied the right of
a person to conduct the litigation in propria persona where he was the
mere assignee of a claim for that specific purpose, and Judge Groner,
in the course of his opinion, remarked, 'No more can a corporation appear in proper person.' (65 App. D. C. 255, 82 F. (2d) 861, at page
863).
"In Osborn et al. v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.)
738, at pages 829, 830, 6 L. Ed. 204, where the court had before it,
among other matters, the question of whether the record of the case
should disclose that the defendant bank authorized the institution or
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prosecution of the suit, Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of his
opinion, stated:
"'It is admitted that a corporation can only appear by attorney and
it is also admitted that the attorney must receive the authority of the
corporation to enable him to represent it * * * A corporation, it is true,
can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for
himself.'
"To like effect is Commercial & Railroad Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 60, 10 L. Ed. 354, where the question involved
was whether or not a corporation in appearing in the court below by an.
attorney and pleading to the jurisdiction of the court, by the very fact.
of its appearance waived all objections to the jurisdiction of the court.
In disposing of this question, the court stated at page 65, 14 Pet., 10
L. Ed. 354:
"'But we are clearly of opinion, that in the case of a corporation
aggregate, no waiver of an objection to jurisdiction could be produced,
by their appearing and pleading by attorney, because, as such a corporation cannot appear but by attorney, to say that such an appearance
would amount to a waiver of the objection, would be to say, that the
party must from necessity forfeit an acknowledged right, by using the
only means which the law affords of asserting that right.'"
There are many decided cases, and it is clearly the great weight of
legal authority that corporations cannot practice law, either directly or
indirectly. Hexter Title and Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 179
S. W. (2d) 946 (Texas), 157 A. L. R. 268, Annotation, page 282; In
re Maclub of America, 3 N. E. (2d) 272 (Mass.), 105 A. L. R. 1360,
Annotation, page 1364; In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 288 P.
157 (Idaho), 73 A. L. R. 1323, Annotation, page 1327; Finnox Realty
Corporationv. Lipntan, 296 N. Y. S. 945.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina is in accord with this majority view, and, as I have said before, the great weight of authority on the
question. State ex rel Seawell v. CarolinaMotor Club, 209 N. C. 624,
184 S. E. 540.
I think, however, the most significant thing in the whole question,
and perhaps the matter which causes the most trouble will be found in
certain statements in our statutes which prohibit corporations from practicing law. For example, in G. S. 84-4, it is made unlawful for a corporation, person or association, except members of the Bar, to practice
law or to appear as an attorney in any action or proceeding in any court
in this State or before the Unemployment Compensation Commission
or to maintain, conduct or defend the same "except in its own behalf
as a party thereto." Further, on in G. S. 84-5, we find that it is unlawful for any corporation to practice or appear as an attorney for any per-
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son "other than itself" in any court in this State or before the Unemployment Compensation Commission. (The name of the Unemployment Compensation Commission has, by statute, been changed to Employment Security Commission.) It is these words which I have placed
in quotes which, upon first inspection, would lead us to believe or to
think that when a corporation has a matter in court or before the Employment Security Commission or its agents, it really can appear in its
own behalf through one of its designated agents, such as the president
of the company or the personnel manager who is a layman and not an
attorney. This question has also been before the courts, and there are
statutes of other states which contain these same words or words of
substantially similar import, and these words have been construed by the
appellate courts of these states. When it is said that it is unlawful for
a corporation to practice law "except in its own behalf as a party
thereto," or that it is unlawful for a corporation to practice or appear
in court as an attorney for any person "other than itself," this is not to
be understood as meaning that laymen or officers of the corporation who
are not licensed to practice law can appear in court or in legal proceedings in behalf of such corporation. These words which appear in quotations and which appear in our statutes are designed simply to give the
corporation authority to have a duly licensed attorney appear for it in
court or before the Employment Security Commission. In other words,
these are authorizing or enabling words or statutes which permit the
corporation to be represented by an attorney of its own choosing or its
regularly retained attorney or by the duly licensed attorneys in its own
legal department who devote their time to the corporation's legal business. Technically, if it were not for this authorization, it is very doubtful if a corporation could be represented even by an attorney without
infringing the other part of the statute (the first part of G. S. 84-4)
(and the first part of G. S. 84-5) which would absolutely forbid legal
representation to a corporation. It was never intended by these words
to allow a corporation to substitute laymen for attorneys at law in appearing in courts and before commissions and in the conduct of legal
proceedings. That this is the proper construction of these words, see
the cases of Aberdeen Bindery v. Eastern States Printing & Publishing
Co., 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 419; In re Maclub of America, 3 N. E. (2d) 272
(Mass.), 105 A. L. R. 1360; Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance
Committee, 179 S. W. (2d) 966 (Texas), 157 A. L. R. 268; Opinion
of the Justices, 180 N. E. 725, 81 A. L. R. 1059; Opinion of the Justices,
194 N. E. 313.
In Aberdeen Bindery v. Eastern States Printing & Publishing Co.,
supra, the Court construed a statute of the State of New York, which
was as follows:
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"It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to
practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person other than itself
in any court in this state or before any judicial body, or to make it a
business to practice as an attorney-at-law, for any person other than itself, in any of said courts."
In commenting on the words "other than itself," the Court said:
"In our opinion, the words 'other than itself' merely grant immunity
to the corporation for an act which otherwise would be the subject of
punishment and do not, expressly or by implication, recognize any ability
by the corporation to bring an action or to appear or answer in person.
That provision does not confer authority or power to so act. No other
statutory provision authorizing a corporation to appear or answer is
called to the attention of this court."
In the case of In re Maclub of America, supra,a Massachusetts statute reads as follows:
"It was enacted by St. 1935, c. 346, S 1, amending G. L. (Ter. Ed. c.
221, s 46, that: 'No corporation * * * shall practice or appear as an attorney for any person other than itself in any court in the commonwealth
or before any judicial body or hold itself out to the public or advertise
as being entitled to practice law * * * or give legal advice in matters not
relating to its lawful business, or practice law, or hold itself out in any
manner as being entitled to do any of the foregoing acts, by or through
any person orally or by advertisement, letter or circular.' Penalties are
established for violation of this section." (Emphasis supplied)
You will note in the above-quoted statute, the same is designated as
Section 1; and in discussing Section 1,the Court commented on the
whole section which contains the words "other than itself" and said:
"The provisions of its first section, so far as concerns the facts shown
on this record, do not enlarge the provisions of the common law touching the practice of law. Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180
N. E. 725, 81 A. L. R. 1059; In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N. E.
495, 55 A. L. R. 1309; In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) 194 N. E.
313. In view of said chapter 346, S 2, it is not necessary to determine
what remedies might be open to the petitioner apart from this statute."
In the case of Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee,
supra, the pertinent Texas statute is as follows:
"Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any corporation to practice law as
defined by this Act or to appear as an attorney for any person other than.
itself in any court in this State, or before any judicial body or any board
or commission of the State of Texas; or hold itself out to the public or
advertise as being entitled to practice law; and no corporation shall
prepare corporation charters or amendments thereto, or other legal documents not relating to its authorized business, or draw wills; or hold
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itself out in any manner directly or indirectly as being entitled to do any
of the foregoing acts :" (Emphasis supplied)
In answer to the Company's contention that it had a right to draw
certain title insurance and other legal papers because of the phrase or
words "other than itself," the Court said:
"It is contended that the preparation of the instruments referred to
relates to the business of its principal of insuring titles. Its contention is
that it has the right to prepare all papers necessary to place a good title
in the applicant, or prospective applicant, in order that it may then safely
insure the title to such property, and that in doing so it is only transacting the business of the title insurance company. We are of the opinion, however, that the preparation of such papers is not the business of
the insurance company."
Other cases could be cited and quoted from along the same lines,
but what I have quoted above should be sufficient. The basic and
underlying reason why corporations cannot be allowed to have representation through executive officers or other agents who are laymen has
been well stated, and, to my mind, the position of the courts in this
matter is unassailable. It is not so much that lawyers are seeking to
create a monopoly in legal affairs and to pre-empt the whole legal field
for themselves as it is a matter of control over persons who appear in
courts and who engage in legal proceedings. This reason is well stated
in the graphic language of Justice Matthews in the case of Finno.x Realty
Corporation v. Lippnan, supra, where he states:
"'Were it possible for corporations to prosecute or defend actions
in person, through their own officers, men unfit by character and training, men whose credo is that the end justifies the means, disbarred lawyers or lawyers of other jurisdictions would soon create opportunities
for themselves as officers of certain classes of corporations and then
freely appear in our courts as a matter of pure business not subject to
the ethics of our profession or the supervision of our bar associations
and the discipline of our courts.' "
I answer your question #1 to the effect that it is the legal duty of
the Commission to decline to allow any person representing a corporation, who is not an attorney licensed under the laws of this State, to
appear before the Commission or its deputies and act in any capacity
as an attorney at law. This would include arguing the case from the
standpoint of the corporation, filing papers, pleadings or any other legal
matter. This would also apply to personnel managers, officers, executive officers or any agent of a corporation who is a layman and not a
properly licensed attorney.
I answer your question #2 that under G. S. 84-5, no officer, agent
or any person can represent the corporation in any legal proceeding be-
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fore the Commission or in the courts unless he is a licensed attorney.
Likewise, the fact that the agent is an executive officer of the corporation 'does not change the answer.
I answer your question #3 that a representative of a corporation
cannot file any legal pleadings or papers before the Commission. Of
course, a corporation who is an employer is authorized to designate
agents to give separation notices and to incorporate therein reas6ns for
separation; but in hearings before a deputy or the Commission, where
legal papers are involved and pleadings, in order for the same to be
valid, they must be filed and signed by the corporation's attorney.
I answer your question #4 that you are correct in refusing to allow
a representative of the labor union, who is not a licensed attorney in
this State, to appear for and on behalf of a claimant or to question the
claimant as a witness or to argue the law with respect to the questions
involved. What I have said about corporations in this letter applies
equally to labor unions as they are mentioned in our statutes along with
corporations by the word "association." I do not think that the deputy
is required to put any questions to a witness suggested by a union representative unless he desires to do so.
In answer to your question #5, in my opinion, Mr. Lane had no
right to appear and do anything in the case or the hearing other than
as a witness, and the fact that he is or is not an officer would not
affect my answer in view of the reasons given in this letter. I am further of the opinion that in seeking and obtaining a continuance and in
closing the evidence for the employer and in doing the things alleged
by Mr. Cahoon, Mr. Lane is acting in the capacity of an attorney or is
engaged in the practice of law. I do not think, therefore, that he has
the legal right to take such actions in the hearing in behalf of the employer. He can only act as a witness.
I answer your question #6 that if Mr. Lane were considered as an
officer of the corporation, my opinion would not be changed at all in
view of what I have said above in connection with question #5. If Mr.
Lane were an executive officer of the corporation, it would give him
no greater right to conduct the hearing in a legal capacity in behalf of
the employer.
I answer your question #7 to the effect that any person who givesdirect testimony in a hearing before a deputy or the Commission should
be required to submit himself to cross-examination by the attorney
representing the claimant or by the claimant, and he should submit himself to further questions by the Claims Deputy or Appeals Deputy conducting the hearing. I use the words "further questioning" because I
doubt if an impartial Claims Deputy or Appeals Deputy should indulge
in cross-examination in the true sense of the word. Of course, he can
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ask an , further questions pertinent to the inquiry in order to satisfy
himself or clarify the matter. If the witness refuses to submit to crossexamination, then I think the deputy can strike out his testimony given
on direct examination and should inform him that unless he submits to
cross-examination on the part of claimant or his attorney or further
questioning on the part of the deputy, his evidence will be stricken from
the record. In lieu of that procedure, I think you can proceed by your
customary contempt proceedings which are authorized by S 964(i) of
the Employment Security Law, that is, you can obtain a court order
requiring the evidence to be given, and upon violation of this order,
such person may be fined or imprisoned.
I trust that this answers the questions submitted to this office.
Yours very truly,
HARRY MCMULLAN

Attorney General
/Sgd./

RALP1 MOODY

Ralph Moody
Assistant Attorney General

